Von Neumann’s Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata: A Useful Framework for Biosemiotics (2025)

The von Neumann self-reproducing architecture, genetic relativism and evolvability

2000

Abstract Within any suitable framework of primitive automaton components (CA or otherwise) the von Neumann architecture for self-reproduction can generally give rise to (an infinity of) infinite sets of self-reproducing automata. The automata within any single such set are characterised as sharing a particular “constructing” or “decoding” subsystem (a “general constructive automaton”).

Von Neumann's quintessential message: genotype + ribotype = phenotype

Artificial Life, 1998

In this short article we argue that von Neumann's quintessential message with respect to self-replicating automata is genotype C ribotype D phenotype. Self-replication of his universal constructor occurs in analogy to nature: The description (genotype) written on the input tape is translated via a ribosome (ribotype) so as to create the offspring universal constructor (phenotype).

Theory of Self-reproducing Automata and Life - Foundation for a Theoretical Biology?

1995

The outline of an argument is presented for deducing the basic chemo-physical properties of life from the knowledge of physical law and von Neumann's theory of selfreproducing automata. This entails an introduction to the problems of the origin of life, and an argument against a common misinterpretation of the 2nd law of thermodynamics proliferated by popular books, e.g., Levy's Artificial Life (Levy 1992).

Living Extremely Flat: The Life of an Automaton; John von Neumann’s Conception of Error of (in)Animate Systems

Going Amiss In Experimental Research, 2009

Proofreading or "editing" has been suggested in DNA replication . . . but a detailed description of its chemical kinetic basis is lacking. The problem is thus to find a simple quantitative model containing the essential features of proofreading scheme. . . . These circumstances allow the construction of a simple mechanism of "kinetic proofreading." 1 John J. Half a century ago, in January 1952, in a lecture delivered at the California Institute of Technology, John von Neumann envisaged the synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components. This was not a science-fiction talk, calling for imaginative creations in the spirit of Ridley Scott's Blade Runners. It was a carefully argued scientific paper in which von Neumann sought to prove the existence of a self-reproducing universal computer. The paper constitutes an important contribution to the consolidation of the theory of automata. Von Neumann did not conceive of cellular automata as mathematical objects for pure investigation; rather, he considered the new algorithm a means for treating in detail the problem of how to make machine reproducible. 2 The realization that cellular automata can demonstrate that "arbitrarily complicated mathematics could be performed within a system whose basic organization is thoroughly rudimentary," 3 is a testimony to the success of von Neumann's idea. Indeed, his construction shows that "a small set of local rules acting on a large repetitive array can result in a structure with very complex behavior. The von Neumann construction thus immediately suggests how an organ with behavior as complex as the brain's can be specified from limited genetic information." 4 To get the basic terms clear, cellular automata are "abstract dynamical systems that play a role in discrete mathematics comparable to that played by partial differential equations in the mathematics of the continuum." 5 These dynamical systems

Von Neumann Minds: Intentional Automata

Mind and Matter, 2015

The problem of intentionality concerns the question of how mental states can come to refer to, or be about, objects external to themselves. Representational attempts to account for this ubiquitous property of mental states lead to the following puzzle: if sensory data is used to construct a representation of the world within the mind, then how is this representation itself perceived? The implication of an in finite iteration of representation-and-perception is what constitutes the homunculus fallacy. I exhibit an analogous problem in the theory of self-reproducing systems, and discuss its solution due to the Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann. I then describe a structure capable of collapsing the in finite regress by fulfi lling both the roles of representation and the representation's user.

Material Representations: From the Genetic Code to the Evolution of Cellular Automata

Artificial life, 2005

Barbieri M (2008) Biosemiotics. A new understanding of life

2008

Biosemiotics is the idea that life is based on semiosis, i.e., on signs and codes. This idea has been strongly suggested by the discovery of the genetic code, but so far it has made little impact in the scientific world and is largely regarded as a philosophy rather than a science. The main reason for this is that modern biology assumes that signs and meanings do not exist at the molecular level, and that the genetic code was not followed by any other organic code for almost four billion years, which implies that it was an utterly isolated exception in the history of life. These ideas have effectively ruled out the existence of semiosis in the organic world, and yet there are experimental facts against all of them. If we look at the evidence of life without the preconditions of the present paradigm, we discover that semiosis is there, in every single cell, and that it has been there since the very beginning. This is what biosemiotics is really about. It is not a philosophy. It is a new scientific paradigm that is rigorously based on experimental facts. Biosemiotics claims that the genetic code (1) is a real code and (2) has been the first of a long series of organic codes that have shaped the history of life on our planet. The reality of the genetic code and the existence of other organic codes imply that life is based on two fundamental processes-copying and coding-and this in turn implies that evolution took place by two distinct mechanisms, i.e., by natural selection (based on copying) and by natural conventions (based on coding). It also implies that the copying of genes works on individual molecules, whereas the coding of proteins operates on collections of molecules, which means that different mechanisms of evolution exist at different levels of organization. This review intends to underline the scientific nature of biosemiotics, and to this purpose, it aims to prove (1) that the cell is a real semiotic system, (2) that the genetic code is a real code, (3) that evolution took place by natural selection and by natural conventions, and (4) that it was natural conventions, i.e., organic codes, that gave origin to the great novelties of macroevolution. Biological semiosis, in other words, is a scientific reality because the codes of life are experimental realities. The time has come, therefore, to acknowledge this fact of life, even if that means abandoning the present theoretical framework in favor of a more general one where biology and semiotics finally come together and become biosemiotics.

In Between the Natural and the Artificial: The Mode of Existence of Self-Reproducing Cellular Automata

Konfigurationen der Zeitlichkeit, 2021

In the context of the invention and construction of the computer in the 1940's and 1950's, John von Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam designed and built artificial automata, i.e. so-called cellular automata. One key feature of cellular automata was self-reproduction. For this reason, the development of models was greatly inspired by crystallography, electrical engineering and molecular biology of that time. In this article, we reconstruct von Neumann's and Ulam's inventive train of thought of cellular automata and how other individuals such as Arthur Burks or John Holland contributed to the further development of the history of cellular automata. As cellular automata emerge, adapt to other cells, reproduce, mutate and evolve, it is possible to speak of a mode of existence of cellular automata, in the sense of Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of technology. That is to say, technical objects can be described with the help of biological concepts and it is important to follow the inventive thought of the constructor. Im Rahmen der Erfindung und Konstruktion der ersten Computer in den 1940er und 1950er Jahren haben John von Neumann und Stanislaw Ulam artifizielle Automaten-sogenannte zelluläre Automaten-entworfen. Eine zentrale Eigenschaft von zellulären Automaten ist ihre Fähigkeit sich selbst zu reproduzieren. Um Selbstreproduktion aber gewährleisten zu können, sind zelluläre Automaten von Modellen aus der Kristallographie, Elektrotechnik und der Molekularbiologie beeinflusst gewesen. Demnach werden in diesem Artikel die Erfindung und Konstruktion von zellulären Automaten von John von Neumann, Stanislaw Ulam und weiteren Personen wie Arthur Burks oder John Holland rekonstruiert. Gerade weil zelluläre Automaten entstehen, sich an andere Zellen anpassen, reproduzieren, mutieren und evolvieren, ist es in einem weiteren Schritt möglich von einer Existenzweise von zellulären Automaten im Sinne von Gilbert Simondons Technikphilosophie zu sprechen. Konkret bedeutet das, dass technische Objekte mit Hilfe von biologischen Begriffen und Konzepten beschrieben werden können, wobei es wichtig ist den erfinderischen Gedankengängen der Konstrukteure zu folgen.

Language as a Model of Biocomplexity

Unifying Themes in Complex Systems

Evolutionary Automata Networks: Henri Atlan's Physical Theory of Intentionality

Journal of Posthuman Studies , 2020

This article focuses on the project of a mechanistic and posthuman history of life as developed by one of the major figures of contemporary biological thought, the biophysicist and theorist of auto-organization Henri Atlan. In particular, it explores Atlan's elaboration of this project in relation to the recent history of biological thought and in contrast to what he identifies as the phenomenological and humanist reduction of natural sciences. As this exploration develops, it shows that Atlan takes up a conception of language, qua natural language, as the analogical and differential code of his history of life. In doing so, it highlights two problems implicit in Atlan's elaboration of his project: the demarcation of natural language from the artificial and metaphorical language of cultural discourses and the conception of properly called intentional auto-organization. Apropos of this second problem, it is argued that, despite Atlan's aim of offering a physical theory of intentionality in general, including human and humanlike intentionality, his description of intentional auto-organization seems, in turn, to subscribe to what he designates as the phenomenological and humanist presupposition of sense-giving consciousness..